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ABSTRACT
Using a feminist critique, this article explores the sliding scale
of value attributed by law to unpaid caregiving in the
(heterosexual) family context. Whereas in private family law,
recent decisions have radically changed the direction of this
discourse and placed a very high value on such a contribution
to family life where it occurs in the married context, the same
kind of caregiving activity is attributed afar diminished value
within cohabitation law whilst, when sited within state-
dependent single parenthood, its value becomes at best non-
existent or even negative, with paid work assumed to be the
carer's ultimate goal. This article considers some issues
arising from this evolving legal framework from the
perspective of gender relations. What are the implications
from an equality-seeking perspective only valuing caregiving
highly in dependent patriarchal relationships, particularly in a
society that continues to retreat from the welfare state? Might
greater participation of men in unpaid caregiving remove
obstacles inherent in the gendered nature of the debate and
permit a more positive reconfiguration of the discourse
surrounding it? What effect might the extension of the law of
financial relief to civil partners have on the discourse from an
equality perspective?
I. Introduction
Few would dispute that unpaid caregiving as presently constructed in British
law and society is a gendered pursuit. It is something which women still do
far more than men and is primarily sited within the private sphere of family
life. Although ideas may be changing, it is still largely viewed as "women's
work" to which men are not by nature or social conditioning suited.' Indeed,
in the heterosexual context, one definition of unpaid caregiving might be "all
the unpaid caring and homemaking work undertaken traditionally by women
within the patriarchal family". Within the marriage contract and wider
family obligations, such caregiving has traditionally been viewed as the
(moral) duty of the (good) wife, mother or daughter, with no economic value
as such but which is performed in exchange for the male breadwinner's legal
and/or moral duty to provide financial support. This patriarchal template for
unpaid caregiving was reproduced and reinforced in Britain during the
See J. Scott "Family and Gender Roles: How Attitudes Are Changing", University
of Cambridge, GeNet Working Paper No. 21, September 2006.
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construction of its welfare state,2 deliberately locating the principal role of
married women within the private domestic sphere rather than in the world
of paid work, excluding them from full-rate National Insurance contributions
and benefits and casting them in law as dependants of breadwinning men.
This, in turn, as Jane Lewis3 has argued, gave rise to a set of normative
expectations about the roles of men and women in the family which have
been internalised and continue to exist long after the emergence of modem
dual-earner families. The result is that women are performing both paid
work (albeit often part-time) and unpaid caregiving with relatively little
change in male behaviour.4 However, family law (if not men) has begun to
respond in interesting ways. First, it has placed an economic value on unpaid
caregiving within marriage at the point of divorce; Secondly, it has adopted a
gender equality discourse.
II. Unpaid Caregiving Within Marriage
As shall be seen, in the main it is the judiciary rather than the legislature
which has taken the lead in a British5 law context. However, in Spain,
legislation aims to make clear that caregiving is a duty to be shared by both
spouses, and that, in theory at least, there will be a price to be paid at the
point of divorce if a gender-stereotypical approach has been adhered to. The
new law6 was promoted by a female Basque National Party MP, Margarita
Uria, and followed a humorous government publicity campaign in 2003
aimed at encouraging men to undertake more domestic work in the home.
Deciding further measures were needed, the legislation was approved by the
Spanish Parliament's Justice Commission and passed as an amendment to the
Spanish Civil Code7 in July 2005. It obliges men as part of the civil marriage
contract to "share domestic responsibilities and the care and attention of
children and elderly family members". As was reported in the press, there is
something of a hill to climb:
2 W. Beveridge et al, Social Insurance and Allied Services (The Beveridge Report),
(Cm 6404) 1942, London: HMSO.
Lewis "The Gender Settlement and Social Provision: the Work-Welfare
Relationship at the Level of the Household." in Europe and the Politics of
Capabilities (R. Salais and R. Villeneuve, eds. 2005); Lewis "The changing context
for the Obligation to Care and to Earn" in Family Law and Family Values (Mavis
McLean, ed. 2005), p.6 1.
4 See Scott, op.cit
5 "British law context" in this article principally denotes the position in England and
Wales which is at the present time almost identical to that of Northern Ireland in
this area of family law. For a summary of recent developments in this field in
Northern Ireland, see Glennon, "Family Law in Northern Ireland - Developments,
Setbacks and an Uncertain Future" in The International Survey of Family Law (A.
Bainham, ed. 2004). Whilst the welfare law context is the same, Scotland has for
some time taken a different approach to financial provision on divorce based on a
principle of equal division of assets which is not needs-based (see Family Law
(Scotland) Act 1985). More recently Scotland has also been first within the UK to
introduce remedies for financial provision available to cohabitants on relationship
breakdown (see now Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006).
6 Ley 15/2005 de 08 de Julio por la que se modifican el C6digo Civil y ia Ley de
Enjucianiento en materia de separaci6n y divorcio [Law amending the Civil Code
on matters of separation and divorce (July 8, 2005).
7 See the amended articles 68 and 92 of the Spanish Civil Code.
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"Spanish men will have to learn to change nappies and don
washing-up gloves under the terms of a new law designed to
strike a blow at centuries of Latin machismo. The law. . . is
likely to provoke a revolution in family affairs in a country
where 40% of men reportedly do no housework at all."'
In theory, failure to comply with the new conditions may provide grounds for
some element of financial compensation on divorce. Time will tell the extent
to which law can reshape behaviour around unpaid caregiving, but clearly
this is an important symbolic step aimed at reversing assumptions about its
gendered nature.
It is also in the marriage context that unpaid caregiving has been seen as
worthy of recognition and financial compensation in England, Wales and
Northern Ireland, but again its value is only realisable on divorce. This is a
very recent development and a complete reversal of female caregivers'
original legal disempowerment. Indeed, for most if not all of the last
century, Blackstone's assessment that mothers were entitled to "no power,
but only reverence and respect"9 held true. Despite the pivotal caregiving
role of a married mother in a child's birth and upbringing, this carried little
or no legal significance right up to the last quarter of the twentieth century.
Married fathers constituted a child's sole legal guardian during marriage
until the Guardianship Act 1973. The Guardianship of Infants Act 1925 was
the first time a mother was even permitted to apply for custody of her child
on divorce. This was in contrast to unmarried mothers who were vested with
full parental authority (but were of course socially and legally stigmatised in
other ways).'°
The Married Women's Property Act 1882, abolishing the doctrine of unity
("couverture") whereby a wife's legal identity and property were subsumed
into that of the husband on marriage," finally allowed married women to
retain their own separate property for the first time. In doing so, a European-
style system of community of property for England and Wales, which would
have entitled a married woman to half the legislatively defined "community
assets" of the family, was rejected. The adopted system of separate property,
gave women no right to make any claim upon the husband's property, either
during marriage or on divorce. As Professor McGregor summarised the
position in a Parliamentary debate in 1979, the separate property regime had:
"unintentionally institutionalised inequality in the economic
relations of husbands and wives. By preventing husbands
getting their hands on their wives' money, the statute denied
8 Adler, "Housework Looms for Spanish Men", BBC News, 17 June 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/4100140.stm
9 Blackstone's Commentaries, Vol. 1, 1869, pp.4 52-4 5 3 .
10 See, e.g. the Bastardy Acts of 1872 and 1923 and the humiliating affiliation
procedures requiring a mother to provide corroborative evidence of the child's
paternity before an) child maintenance could be ordered under the Affiliation Act
1957. The maintenance ordered was in any event generally very low and the Act
was not repealed until the Family Law Reform Act 1987.
1 See further S. Cretney, Family Law in the Twentieth Century (OUP, Oxford,
2005), p.4 03 .
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wives rights in their husbands' money. And in the real world it
was mostly husbands who had the money."12
On divorce prior to 1970, no financial value was placed on a wife's
caregiving during the marriage. This was deemed to be the quidpro quo for
having been maintained by her husband, however much greater the "market
value" of such caregiving services might actually have been. Only
maintenance from income was available 3 at the discretion of the court and
only to a blameless wife4 who remained sexually faithful to her ex-
husband, 5 with capital (including the family home), being retained by the
owner of the property, most often the husband.
The injustice of this was hotly debated and considered by the Law
Commission throughout the 1970s. 6 Finally, though, any automatic
resource-sharing system such as community of property or statutory co-
ownership of the matrimonial home was rejected and instead, on divorce in
England and Wales, a discretionary system of redistribution of both income
and capital assets was established in order to alleviate the financial hardship
suffered by women on marriage breakdown. 7
The criteria which govern this discretionary redistribution, now contained in
section 25 of Matrimonial Causes Act 1973,"8 are interesting in that they
12 Official Report (House of Lords) 18 July 1979, vol. 401 col. 1437. For an
example of how harshly this operated, see Gissing v Gissing [1971] A.C. 886.
" This was first established in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1857 and, until the
Matrimonial Causes Act 1907, was only payable where there were sufficient assets
against which the maintenance could be secured. See further Cretney, op.cit.,
p.397.
'4 It had to be established in Fisher v Fisher (1861) 2 SW&Tr 410 that even a
blameless wife had the right to maintenance where she initiated the divorce.
Although there was not general provision for property adjustment, the court could
order an adulterous wife's property to be settled on the husband and children,
Matrimonial Causes Act 1857, s.45. See Cretney, op.cit., p.444.
15 Maintenance could be and frequently was denied or terminated even long after the
divorce, if the former wife committed adultery, see, e.g. M v M [1962] 2 All ER
895, where maintenance was terminated when a wife who had been granted a
divorce on the grounds of her husband's adultery had a child by another man some
II years after she separated from her husband. See further C. Smart, The Ties that
Bind (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1984).
16 See Law Commission 1969, Financial Provision in Matrimonial Proceedings,
Law Com. No. 25, HMSO, London; Law Commission 1971, Family Property Law
Working Paper No. 42. HMSO, London; Law Commission 1973. First Report on
Family Property: A New Approach Law Com no. 52 HMSO, London; Law
Commission 1978, Third Report on Family Property: The Matrimonial Home Co-
ownership and Occupation Rights) and Household Goods) Law Com no. 86
HMSO, London.
17 The Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act 1970 was introduced alongside
divorce reform in the Divorce Reform Act 1969 and see now Part II Matrimonial
Causes Act 1973, the consolidating Act. This now permits not only periodical
maintenance payment orders but lump sum orders, property adjustment orders and
orders for sale of property of either party.
's The Matrimonial Causes (Northern Ireland) Order 1978, art.27 contains the same
criteria in the Northern Ireland context and they have also been replicated in the
Civil Partnership Act 2004, Sch.5, Pt.5, para.21(2) and now also govern financial
provision on dissolution of same-sex civil partnerships.
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recognise that both financial and non-financial contributions to the welfare of
the family should be weighed into the equation. This list of matters, to
which the court must have regard when making financial provision orders,
includes all the circumstances of the case, the standard of living during the
marriage, the age of the parties and duration of the marriage, the parties'
respective current and future income and assets, needs and resources as well
as financial and (critically) non-financial contributions made and likely to be
made to the welfare of the family by each of the parties and conduct it would
be inequitable to ignore. The welfare of the children has been made the
court's first (but not paramount) consideration and the court has a duty to
consider the appropriateness of effecting a clean break between the parties.' 9
Other than this, no guidance is given on the relative importance to be given
to the different criteria; this was left to the discretion of the court. However,
it is the weight to be given to non-financial (or caregiving) contributions to
the welfare of the family that has changed beyond all recognition since the
Act was introduced in the 1970s. In its original form, section 25 provided a
guiding principle that the court should endeavour to place the parties as
nearly as possible in the financial position they would have been in had the
marriage not broken down. However, this minimal loss principle was soon
seen to be impossible to achieve even before the legislation was amended to
remove it in 1984, and it was the non-financial contributor whose share came
to be valued less in financial terms.
Following the 1970s reforms, the construction of the value of the wife's
unpaid caregiving role in judicial discourse was double-edged. Although it
might entitle her to a share of the assets (a vast improvement on the previous
law in an era where family homes were generally still owned and paid for
solely by the husband, with a wife's non-financial and even financial
contributions - such as payment for clothing or utility bills - being less
tangible), a wife's post-divorce financial needs were reduced by virtue of her
ability to perform a caregiving role for herself. As Lord Denning, seeking to
justify why a wife should only be entitled to one third of the joint income and
capital assets on divorce, explained without any trace of irony in Wachtel v
Wachtel:2°
"The husband will have to go out to work all day and must get
some woman to look after the house - either a wife, if he
remarries, or a housekeeper, if he does not. The wife will not
usually have so much expense. She may go out to work
herself, but she will not usually employ a housekeeper. She
will do most of the housework herself, perhaps with some
help. Or she may remarry, in which case her new husband will
provide for her."
Clearly, housework at this time could only be performed by women and far
from being worthy in the family context of increased retrospective financial
recognition for caregiving services rendered by wives, men's "inability" to
perform these same services unpaid instead acted to diminish a wife's
financial award!
'9 ss.25 and 25A Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 as amended by the Matrimonial and
Family Proceedings Act 1984.20 [1973] Fain. 72 (CA).
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Again, in another decision in 1973, Trippas v Trippas21 , Lord Denning
explained the unpaid nature of a wife's role in a case where the wife claimed
a share of the husband's family business on divorce:
"She did not give any active help in it. She did not work in it
herself. All she did was what a good wife does do. She gave
moral support to her husband by looking after the home. If he
was depressed or in difficulty, she would encourage him to
keep going. That does not give her a share."
Thus the law at this time, whilst acknowledging they were of some value,
seemed unable to attribute to a wife's unpaid caregiving contributions to a
marriage, however critical to the overall wealth of the family, a value of
more than one third.22 Financial contributions trumped non-financial
contributions in asset redistribution on divorce.
The 1970s reforms were also open to criticism by feminists for having
reinforced women's dependence on men. In an age when women's formal
equality in the public sphere was being fought hard for, an entitlement to
financial support from men could be seen to undermine the greater cause.23
It was thought that, post-divorce, women and men should become financially
independent of each other, a view shared with men's groups such as
Campaign for Justice on Divorce. Indeed, the financial plight of divorced
men rather than divorced women became the political issue and, following
the 1979 general election, the new Conservative administration was swift to
introduce reform in the shape of the Matrimonial and Family Proceedings
Act 1984, making the welfare of any children the first consideration,
restricting a wife's right to life-long maintenance where paid work could be
attained, and requiring courts to consider a financial clean break.
In practice, what this came to mean is that needs rather than any aim to
redistribute financial assets equally came to dominate the approach under
section 25. According to District Judge Roger Bird in 2000, the approach of
the courts was to meet the housing needs of the primary carer and the
children and then the other reasonable needs of both parties if possible.
Once these are met, then in is his view "there is no justification for further
adjustment by the court".24 This "reasonable requirements" approach which
dominated from the mid-1980s until the decision of the House of Lords in
White v White in 200 1, continued to assign a lower value to caregiving or, in
the words of the 1973 Act, to the non-financial contributions to the welfare
of the family, than to the financial contributions.
In Dart v Dart 5 in 1996, the Court of Appeal rejected the notion that there
was any principle of equal division even of assets acquired by joint efforts -
rather a wife's claim was limited to a ceiling of her "reasonable
requirements", which were calculated in the context of the standard of living
during the marriage. As Diduck has argued, this line of case law reflects
21 [1973] Fam. 134 (CA).
22 See, e.g. Lord Justice Ormnrod's judgment in Rodewald v Rodewald [1977] Fain.
192 and see further Cretney, op.cit., p.430.
23 See Deech, "The Principles of Maintenance" [19771 Fam Law 229, A. Diduck and
F. Kaganas, Family Law, Gender and the State,2nd ed. (Hart, Oxford, 2006), p.2 40 .
24 Bird, "Ancillary Relief Outcomes" [2000] Fain Law 831.
25 [1996] 2 FLR 286.
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principles of protection of property and individual liberty, rather than any
notion of marriage as an equal partnership.26 At this stage, the Act which
had given no guidance as to how much weight was to be given to each of the
criteria, had been interpreted to place the needs of the parties at the pinnacle
of the court's considerations, rendering it a welfare-based rather than
entitlement-based redistribution. However, this was about to change.
In White v White,27 the House of Lords interpreted section 25 so as to include
an overall aim of fairness which incorporated for the first time a principle of
non-discrimination as between breadwinners and homemakers. The division
of assets was in each case to be measured against "a yardstick of equality",
which should only be departed from where it could be justified. This was
certainly a considerable advance on the one third rule and a ceiling of
reasonable requirements. Indeed, this can be seen as something of a
paradigm shift in the way that the courts construct the value of unpaid
caregiving. Lord Nicholls set out the radical new thinking:28
"If, in their different spheres, each contributed equally to the
family, then in principle it matters not which of them earned
the money and built up the assets. There should be no bias in
favour of the money-earner and against the home-maker and
the child-carer."
As Eekelaar29 observed, this was a move away from the language of a
welfare-style dependency construction of a wife's needs towards a new
entitlement basis, with entitlement having been earned through unpaid
caregiving.
Subsequently, in deciding whether the money-earner has made an
exceptional contribution which justifies departure from the yardstick of
equality,3" the courts have largely stood firm in rejecting pressure from
wealthy husbands. In Lambert v Lambert3' the husband, an extremely
successful businessman, argued disparagingly that his wife's life merely
revolved around "the kids and the microwave". However, the Court of
Appeal made clear this was a case where non-discrimination must apply and
cited with approval the equality approach taken in an earlier High Court
decision:
"The husband's role was the more glamorous, interesting and
exciting one. The wife's involved the more mundane daily
round of the consistent carer. That was the way that the parties
to this marriage chose, between themselves, to organise the
overall matrimonial division of labour. How can it be said
fairly, at the end of the day, that one role was more useful or
valuable (let alone special or outstanding) than the other in
26 Diduck, "'Fairness and Justice for All?' The House of Lords in White v White"
[2001] Feminist Legal Studies 173.
27 [2001] 1 AC 596.
28 ibid., at 605.
29 Eekelaar, "Back to basics and forward into the Unknown" [2001] Far Law 30.
30 This was accepted in Cowan v Cowan [2001] EWCA 679 where the millionaire
husband, the inventor of the draw-string dustbin bag, was adjudged to have made a
sufficiently "stellar"' contribution.
3' [2002] EWCA Civ. 1685.
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terms of the overall benefit to the marriage partnership or to
the family?"32
Similarly in the Northern Irish case, M v M33, McLaughlin J's refusal to
discriminate and endorsement of the equal value of caregiving was cited with
approval in Lambert:
"The husband worked very long hours getting out of bed at
6.00am to be at work by 7.00am. His work did not finish until
late in the evening as he carried on his working day by
supervising Y limited and the other business premises owned
by the company. I accept all of that evidence as true, but to
concentrate on that and fail to recognise that, whilst he toiled
at work on company business, Mrs M from early in the
morning was getting the children ready for school, taking them
there, running the home during the day, collecting them after
school, cooking and cleaning, nurturing them by ferrying them
to social, sporting and recreational activities, supervising
homework and tutoring them when required, would be to be
guilty of the very kind of discrimination warned against by
Lord Nicholls.
34
Thus in long marriages where the assets exceed needs, an equal value was
placed on financial and non-financial contributions. However, this was not
the case in shorter marriages of less than twenty years, where the financial
assets were all brought into the marriage by the husband. In GW v RW,3"
such a twelve year marriage justified departure from equality:
"I find it to be fundamentally unfair to be required to find that
a party who has made domestic contributions during a
marriage of 12 years should be awarded the same proportion of
the assets as a party who has made the domestic contributions
for a period in excess of 20 years. 36
This durational approach to non-financial contributions, whereby they,
unlike financial contributions can only be earned over time,37 can be seen to
discriminate at least indirectly against women.3 ' However, the House of
Lords has now recognised this for itself and in Miller v Miller; McFarlane v
McFarlane,39 Lord Nicholls, commenting on "accrual over time" as put
forward in GWv RW, rejected it:
"This approach would mean that on the breakdown of a short
marriage the money earner would have a head start of the
32 ibid., Per Thorpe LI at para.22 citing Coleridge J in G v G, at that time
unreported.
33 [2002] NUB 47.
34 Per Thorpe LI in Lambert v Lambert, above n.31 at para.23.
31 [2003] EWHC 611.
36 At para. 43, per Mostyn QC.
37 The approach favoured here had been suggested by Eekelaar in "Asset
Distribution on Divorce -The Durational Element" (2001) 117 LQR 552.
38 This has been argued principally by Bailey-Harris, "The Paradoxes of Principle
and Pragmatism: Ancillary Relief in England and Wales" (2005) 19 IJLPF 229-
241.
39 [2006] UKHL 24.
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homemaker and child-carer. To confine the White approach to
the "fruits of a long marital partnership" would be to re-
introduce precisely the sort of discrimination the White case
was intended to negate.
This latest decision has introduced some further recognition of the value of
caregiving. For, in addition to divorce settlements needing to address the
parties' needs and apply the yardstick of equality to sharing assets in a non-
discriminatory way in order to achieve fairness, it indicates that a third
rationale for making a financial provision award on divorce is compensation
for."relationship-generated disadvantage".4' Whilst overlapping with need,
this aims to achieve fairness by compensating for loss suffered by
undertaking caregiving within marriage at the expense, say, of a spouse's
labour market value. In the case of McFarlane, the wife had given up her
career as a successful city solicitor in order to care for the parties' three
children during a nineteen-year marriage, whereas her husband's career had
flourished. This was clearly a case for compensation over and above her
needs, the court found, notwithstanding the fact that section 25 of the
Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 makes no mention of compensation. Miller, in
contrast, (heard at the same time) involved a childless marriage of less than
two years between a multi-millionaire and a professional woman who gave
up her £85,000 per annum job on marriage in order to take on the role of
homemaker. The divorce, granted on grounds of the husband's adultery,
allowed Mrs Miller to be awarded £5 million of the husband's total worth
estimated at £32 million. It was accepted here that she had not suffered very
much relationship-generated disadvantage, but she had been used to an
extremely high standard of living during the marriage and much of the
wealth had been generated during that period, albeit by the husband's efforts.
The court nonetheless firmly rejected the earlier approach of placing the
parties back into the financial position they were in before the marriage.
This latest authority, whilst it has left open the exact extent of assets to be
shared in any particular case,4 2 has made the principle of non-discrimination
between breadwinner and caregiver very clear. In addition, in lower asset
cases, it has also made clear that an equal division of assets might
discriminate against the caregiving spouse, where a bigger award may be
needed to be made to the weaker economic spouse, who will continue to be
the primary carer of the children, to ensure that they and the children's
housing needs are met.43
Thus a caregiving wife on divorce where there are children will get at least
half of the family assets. From a policy perspective this has been seen as
important, as was acknowledged by Hale LJ (as she then was) in SRJ v DWJ
(Financial Provision44):
40 ibid., at para. 19, case references omitted.
41 See judgment of Baroness Hale at para. 140.
42 The House of Lords divided assets into matrimonial or family assets such as the
home, which had to be shared equally regardless of ownership, and non-
matrimonial or non-family assets attributable to the efforts of just one spouse.
However, there was disagreement between the judgments of Lord Nicholls and
Baroness Hale on how these were defined and the effect any division would have.
43 Per Lord Nicholls at paras.12-14.
44 [199912 FLR 179 at 182.
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"It is not only in [the child's] interests but in the community's
interests that parents, whether mothers or fathers and spouses,
whether husbands or wives, should have a real choice between
concentrating on breadwinning and concentrating on home-
making and child-rearing, and do not feel forced, for fear of
what might happen should their marriage break down much
later in life, to abandon looking after the home and the family
to other people for the sake of maintaining a career."
However, ironically, this may also mean that a wife who works throughout
the marriage and does the majority of caregiving may not have suffered
"relationship generated disadvantage" and consequently be awarded a lesser
share of the assets on divorce than a homemaker spouse. Might this, then,
provide a disincentive for women to retain their place in the public sphere of
work during marriage? Does it open the door wider to "gold-diggers"?
Generally the new era in financial provision cases has been welcomed as
addressing the reality of the situation of many women but it can be criticised
for doing this in a way which reinforces the patriarchal financial dependence
of childcaring women upon breadwinning men.45 At the same time, other
commentators have interpreted developments more positively as embodying
a welcome egalitarian discourse of partnership. 6
However, such a discourse is nowhere yet apparent within unmarried
cohabiting partnerships.
III. Unpaid Caregiving in Cohabiting Relationships
Whilst a divorcing home-maker spouse where the major assets including the
home are in the name of the other spouse will usually receive at least half of
the assets, a home-maker cohabitant in a similar position must prove an
interest under a constructive trust to retain any share of the home.47 This, as
Valerie Bums in Burns v Burns48 found to her cost, is often a difficult and
always an unpredictable prospect for the economically weaker cohabitant.
On the other hand, a woman who is the main breadwinner, has contributed
most financially to purchase of the home and is also the primary caregiver
may, following a recent House of Lords decision, fare better as a cohabitant
than a divorcing wife.49 The critical difference here is that in the
cohabitation context, property law applies and caregiving does not, of itself,
45 See, e.g. Diduck, op.cit.
46 Bottomley and Wong, "Shared Households: A New Paradign for Thinking about
the Reform of Domestic Property Relations" in Feminist Perspectives on Family
Law,( Diduck, and O'Donovan eds. 2006).
47 Once again, the law described here reflects the position in England and Wales and
Northern Ireland as Scots law takes a different approach and has used the law of
unjust enrichment in disputes between cohabitants, as in McKenzie v Nutter 2007
SLT (Sh Ct) 17.
48 [1984] IAII ER 244.
49 See Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 where such a scenario led the court to
award the woman and mother of four children 65% of the family home vested in
joint names but without declarations of the beneficial interests. Her former
cohabitant and father of the children who had undertaken work on their properties
and made some uncertain financial contributions, had not always worked but had
not taken on the role of primary carer for the children was restricted to 35 per cent,
which he might have improved upon had they been married.
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give rise to ownership in this jurisdiction. Whilst the courts have been more
receptive to arguments which enable the court to take the couple's whole
course of dealing into account alongside direct contributions to the
purchase,5" a development which can lead to a conclusion that the property is
beneficially owned by both partners despite the legal title being vested in
only one of them, where there has been no direct contribution5 such as some
payment towards the mortgage or improvements or other evidence of implied
common intention to share ownership of the home (such as a provable
promise to share ownership 2 or an excuse made to avoid formal shared
ownership53), there will be no constructive or resulting trust. 4 Whilst
transfer of property orders can be made for the benefit of a child under 18
(Schedule I Children Act 1989), unless the primary carer is a joint owner or
can prove an interest under a resulting or constructive trust, the best outcome
is likely to be the right to occupy the home until the children finish full time
education with no transfer of capital whatsoever. To transfer any interest in
the home to the primary caring parent was described in a case where a
cohabiting mother had raised five children as an inappropriate "indirect
windfall" and the home after the youngest child had finished full-time
education was to revert to the father, as the mother had no right to
maintenance for herself.55 In this context, there is certainly no pursuit of
fairness and given developments in the divorce context which have taken on
an egalitarian discourse of partnership, it seems that outside this family law
context, unpaid caregiving still has little or no value. Periodical payment
orders from income for the benefit of the child may now have an element
built in for the primary carer 6 where income is extremely high and lifts a
parent above the child support threshold.
In Re P (Child.- Financial Provision)" the new approach to claims in the
high income context under Schedule I Children Act 1989 is revealed:
"The mother's entitlement to an allowance as the primary carer
should be checked but not diminished by the absence of any
direct claim in law. The court should recognise the
responsibility, and often sacrifice, of the unmarried parent
(generally the mother) who was to be the primary carer of the
child. The carer should have control of a budget that reflects
her position and that of the father, both social and financial."
50 See Midland Bank v Cooke [1995] 4 All ER 562. Drake v Whip [1996] 1 FLR
826, Le Foe v Le Foe [2001] 2 FLR 970 Oxley v Hiscock [2004] EWCA Civ. 546,
Fam Law 569, Cox v Jones [2004] EWHC 1486 (Ch) [2004] Fain Law 698
51 See Lloyds Bank PLC v Rossett [1991] I AC 107.
52 See, e.g. Hammondv Mitchell [1991] I WLR 1127.
53 See, e.g. Grant v Edwards [1986] Ch 638.
54 In the recent case of Stack v Dowden, above n.49, Lord Walker expressed the view
obiter that doubt may be cast on whether the stringent requirements as to what can
and cannot constitute a direct contribution as set out by Lord Bridge in Lloyds
Bank v Rosselt (above n.51) is still good law (at para.26). However, this was not
addressed in the leading judgment given by Baroness Hale.
55 See T v S (Financial Provisionfor Children) [1994] 2 FLR 883.
56 See Re P [2003]EWCA Civ. 837 and H v M [2006] Fain Law 927.
57 ibid.
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Thus there is increased awareness of the value of unpaid caregiving which is
still constrained within a legal framework which lacks the discretion of the
divorce context. There is still no right to maintenance as between adult
former cohabitants, however disadvantaged the primary carer may have been
in the labour market as a result of the relationship.
The Law Commission are currently consulting on proposals to compensate
cohabitants for economic disadvantage suffered on relationship breakdown
or death.5" It is likely to recommend a presumptive approach to regulating
informal cohabitation outside marriage or civil partnership which does not
mirror that available on divorce or partnership dissolution at least for
cohabitants with children of the relationship. The Law Commission were
asked to address the financial hardship suffered by cohabitants when
relationships break down or when a partner dies. This has not been
interpreted as a brief to promote equality between those who cohabit and
those who marry. The reasons for this are discussed at length in the
Consultation Paper,59 but it is clear that it is not felt appropriate to impose the
same rights and obligations on informally cohabiting couples who have not
actively signed up for marriage or civil partnership. Whilst it is recognised
that this might be unfair in cases such as Mrs Bums, it is considered
important not to undermine either the autonomy of those deliberately
choosing not to marry or, indeed, marriage itself:
"The law does not generally help those who voluntarily put
themselves in a position where they suffer financial hardship
unless there was a clear agreement, intention or some other
recognised trigger justifying the provision of a remedy."
However, financial hardship where generated by the cohabitation
relationship should, it is proposed, warrant a legal remedy. Under the
proposals a former cohabitant's claim may be based on "contributions and
sacrifices"6 . They should be able to make a claim against their partner
wherever it can be shown that:
(1) the respondent had been enabled to retain some economic
benefit (in terms of a gain in capital, income, or earning
capacity) at the point of separation; and
(2) that gain has been caused at least in part by contributions
made by the applicant.62
Alternatively a claim may be founded where a partner can show relationship-
generated economic disadvantage, where this has arisen from decisions and
choices jointly made.63 The classic example given is a mother who gives up
work to look after the children of the relationship. However, the approach
proposed is not to compensate for disadvantage suffered during the
relationship but rather, to repair the disadvantage the applicant will
58 Law Commission for England and Wales, Cohabitation: The Financial
Consequences of Relationship Breakdown - A Consultation Paper, 2006. London,
The Stationery Office.
5 ibid., para.2.42 et seq (Overview).
60 ibid., (Overview) para.2.44.
61 ibid., para.3.85 (Overview).
62 ibid., para.6.134.
63 ibid., para.6.154.
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experience in the future as a result of sacrifices made during the
relationship.' How exactly this is to be calculated without a crystal ball
remains to be seen.6' Nonetheless, the actual caregiving within cohabitation
relationships remains unpaid at the point of separation, although
compensation may be available to redress the caregiver's labour market
value. Periodical maintenance, if available at all, is also to be limited to a
short period, with parties both being expected to take up paid work. Whilst
this meets some of the feminist criticisms of the way the law of financial
provision on divorce encourages married women's dependence on men in the
divorce context, it is clearly placing a lower value on caregiving by
functionally similar cohabiting mothers, which is difficult to justify given the
social acceptance of cohabitation as a parenting and partnering form.'
Furthermore, the already working cohabiting mother may suffer additional
loss if her relationship-generated disadvantage only appears after the
relationship has ended due to childcare difficulties as a single parent family,
which did not exist during the relationship. Whilst it is hoped that the
proposed scheme would entitle a claim, it is not proposed to provide a very
big window for claims67 and unpaid caregiving performed in the place of
full-time paid work in this context then becomes the burden of the state.
IV: Unpaid Caregiving by Lone Parents
With the possible exception of the lauded but little-remunerated full-time
carers of elderly or disabled relatives, it is in the lone parent context that the
law seems to give full-time unpaid caregiving its lowest value. This is
despite the fact that from a child's perspective, surely here the primary carer
is doubly important? However, where the state rather than a former partner
is the paymaster, a completely different gloss is given to caregiving under
New Labour's communitarian approach.
This is most apparent in the New Deal for Lone Parents. Since 30th April
2001 all lone parents with a youngest child aged five years and three months
or who make a first claim for Income Support or a repeat claim after a period
in work, have been required to attend a work-focused meeting with a
Personal Adviser, as a condition of receiving benefit. They can claim a
refund of their travel costs, if they have to travel to the Jobcentre, and any
registered childcare costs they have incurred. All lone parents who are
entitled to income support on or after the 5th April 2004 have to have an
interview with a personal adviser regardless of the age of their youngest
child unless exempt. If they fail to attend for interview, a benefit penalty is
imposed.6" However, at the current time, lone parents are not obliged to look
64 ibid., para.6.163.
65 For a fuller discussion of these difficulties, see Probert, "Cohabitation:
Contributions and Sacrifices" [2006] Fam Law 1060.
66 See A. Barlow, S. Duncan, G. James and A. Park, Cohabitation Marriage and the
Law, Social Change and Legal Reform in the 21" Century (Hart, Oxford, 2005),
chap.2.
67 It is proposed that claims should normally be brought within one year of
separation or of the birth of a child of the relationship if later. See above, n.58.
("Overview") para.7.6.
68 This is up to a maximum of 25 per cent of the adult's income support allowance
for six months.
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for work as a condition of receiving benefit until their youngest child reaches
the age of 16.
The lone parent employment rate in 2006 in Great Britain stands at 56.5 per
cent, an increase of 11.8 percentage points since 1997 and an all-time high.69
Undoubtedly this has been driven by the New Deal for Lone Parents which
has helped 483,000 lone parents into employment, of which 293,000 have
entered into sustained employment. The number on benefits has also been
reduced by around a quarter of a million since 1997, to 783,000.70 However,
since 2004, this employment rate has only increased by 0.5 per cent and thus,
despite the claimed success of the New Deal for Lone Parents, the recent
Freud Report7' has proposed that this group should be targeted further to
achieve an employment target of 70 per cent by 2010, a tactic perhaps
reminiscent of a much harsher American approach.72 It is now proposed that
once their youngest child is 12, the much stigmatised lone parent be required
to seek work.73 The driving force behind this is stated to be a reduction in
and eventual eradication of child poverty as "tackling worklessness among
lone parents is key to tackling poverty".74 The Government estimates that
around 47 per cent of children living with a workless lone parent are in
relative income poverty and an integral part of the solution to this is paid
work, especially given that eight out of ten lone parents state that they want
to work. As Lisa Harker has explained:
"There is wide recognition that relying solely on benefit and
tax credit increases to reduce child poverty would be
undesirable since, for many families, an income through paid
employment offers a more effective and sustainable route out
of poverty.""
Thus paid work is the mantra of New Labour's quest for social cohesion and
eradication of child poverty, without any examination of the quality of
unpaid caregiving that might be lost in this process. Research shows that
some lone parents actively choose poverty in order to care better, as they see
it, for their children in the face of economically rational incentives to choose
work.76 Other research indicates that many women would still choose to give
up work to care for children or other dependants even if quality care was
69 D. Freud, Reducing dependency, increasing opportunity: options for the future of
welfare to work: An independent report to the Department for Work and Pensions,
2007, Leeds: Department for Work and Pensions, p.37.
70 ibid.
71 ibid This follows up aspects flagged in Department for Work and Pensions Five
year strategy: Opportunity and Security throughout Life, 2005, London: TSO and
New Deal for Welfare: empowering people to work, Department for Work and
Pensions, CM 6730, 2006, London: TSO.
72 See Miller, "The art of persuasion? The British deal for lone parents" in The
Welfare we Want: the British Challenge for American Reform (Walker. and
Wiseman, (eds. 2005) pp. 115-142.
74 Freud, op. cit., n.59.
75 ibid., at p.37.
7 Lisa Harker ,Delivering on Child Poverty: what would it take? A report for the
Department for Work and Pensions, November 2006, cited in the Freud Report,
op. cit.
76 S. Duncan and R. Edwards, Lone Mothers, Paid Work and Gendered Moral
Rationalities (Macmillan, London, 1999).
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available and affordable to them." Aside from what the promised family-
friendly employment policies will amount to in practice for this age group,
one is left to wonder how constructively teenagers whose lone primary carer
is at work when they return from school will amuse themselves away from
any watchful parental eye. Perhaps caregiving has more to offer social
cohesion than is currently appreciated.
IV: Conclusion
The push to create mother worker citizens as evidenced in the New Deal for
Lone Parents confirms that the welfare state's view of unpaid caregiving by
lone parents has moved in the opposite direction to that of the new emerging
family law discourse in British case law and Spanish legislation. As
American, Daniel Moynihan, aptly commented back in 1973:
"If American society recognized home making and child
rearing as productive work to be included in the national
economic accounts ... the receipt of welfare might not imply
dependency. But we don't. It may be hoped the women's
movement of the present time will change this. But as of the
time I write, it had not.
T78
Even by 2007, we have not come very far in terms of recognition of its value
by the public purse. Just how progressive the greater value attributed to
caregiving in the divorce context will prove to be remains to be seen. It
might reinforce the dependency of men on women as the social norm within
marriage, slowing down the move away from a patriarchal marriage model.
It is also possible that economically rational men will avoid marriage, thus
occasioning more cohabitation and lone parenthood in which caregiving is
valued less. Another avoidance tactic might be to lobby for enforceable pre-
marital agreements, although this would at least allow both spouses to
negotiate around its value.
Yet another way forward is that caregiving will become less gendered within
dual earner families and more generally.79 In this way, caregiving might
become a less of a social threat within the social welfare discourse if it is
shared with men. Already, recent studies show that a third of all parental
childcare is now undertaken by men and where mothers work, one third cite
fathers as the main child carer while they are at work."0 Some fathers even
sacrifice their own career ambitions in order to spend more time with their
children at a certain point in their lives.8' However, there may be no
immediate change here. Homemaking does not hold great appeal to men and
77 W. Flatten, L. Vinter and E. Williams, Dads on Dads. Needs and expectations at
home and at work, EOC Research Discussion Series (EOC, Manchester, 2002).
78 D. P. Moynihan, The Politics of a Guaranteed Income (Random House, 1973),
p.17.
9 Research by Scott et al seems to indicate this is a slower process than women's
increased participation in the labour market. See Scott op.cit.
80 M. O'Brien and I. Shemilt, Working Fathers, Equal Opportunities. Commission
Discussion Series. (EOC, Manchester, 2003).
81 S. Dex, Families and Work in the Twenty-First Century (Joseph Rowntree
Foundation, York, 2003).
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childcare is still principally undertaken by women, as Scott's research
findings indicate:
"One of the puzzles that the ESRC Research Network on
Gender Inequalities in Production and Reproduction was set up
to answer is whether the "paradigm shift" in gender relations
that has accompanied the demise of the male breadwinner
family will result in more or less equality. New research from
the Network shows that while there has been immense shifts in
women's lives, in the way family and work responsibilities are
combined, the evidence does not support great optimism about
the future involvement of men in family chores and care. "'
Whilst the egalitarian partnership discourse now embodied in divorce law
has reappraised the social value of what women do unpaid in raising children
and looking after the home, this high economic value for such domestic
labour is confined to one area of law and to a narrow band of families where
assets exceed needs. It also seems apparent that the equality approach
contained within the new family law discourse is double-edged and may be
shortlived. Where men do share housework and caregiving during the
relationship, on relationship breakdown this could both bolster the equality
argument for shared parenting by fathers and reduce the family assets
available for redistribution to each party, as there will be two rather than one
primary carers and two sets of housing needs to address. This also raises
issues around the choice to undertake unpaid care giving within families. As
has been seen in the Law Commission's proposals for reform of cohabitation
law, only a joint decision that one parent should undertake child care will be
sufficient to justify a claim for compensation for economic disadvantage
consequently suffered. This seems to provide a very easy way for the
breadwinner to avoid any such payment, returning caregiving to a negative
financial value.
More positively, Gershuny and Bittman's cross-national longitudinal study
highlights the notion of "lagged adaptation". Women respond to increased
labour force participation speedily by reducing their daily hours of home
chores, while men's adaptation takes longer and is (not just anecdotally it
seems) less reliable. However, they did find that the relative share of men's
and women's domestic tasks becomes more equal over time."
To end this discussion of the tensions within the schizophrenic legal
constructions of caregiving, perhaps we need to be reminded how caregiving
could be constructed as an ideal in Martha Fineman's suggested redefinition
of family law. She proposes the replacement of the patriarchal family with
the caregiving family, explaining:
"In my newly redefined category of family, I would place
inevitable dependants along with their caregivers. The
caregiving family would be a protected space, entitled to
special preferred treatment by the state. . . I proposed
82 Scott, op.cit.
83 Gershuny and Bittman, "Exit, Voice and Suffering: Do Couples Adapt to
Changing Employment Patterns?" (2005) 67 Journal of Marriage and Family,
pp.656-665.
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Mother/Child as the substitute core of the basic family
paradigm. Our laws and policies would be compelled to focus
on the needs of this unit. Mother/child would provide the
structural and ideological basis for the transfer of current
societal subsidies (both material and ideological) away from
the sexual family to nurturing units. . . Two additional
theoretical caveats are necessary. First, I believe that men can
and should be mothers... Second, the child in my dyad stands
for all forms of inevitable dependency - the dependency of the
ill, the elderly, the disabled, as well as actual children. 84
Whilst fulfilment of this ideal in terms of the role it envisages for the state
seems at best a remote possibility in the British context, a more neutral view
of the value of caregiving disentangled from the history of the gendered roles
within the patriarchal family may soon be glimpsed in litigation surrounding
financial relief on the dissolution of same-sex civil partnerships.85 Despite
urgings that the law should acknowledge the differences between same and
different-sex relationships rather than assume the same power dynamic
exists, 6 civil partnerships and their dissolution have for good or ill been
created in the image of marriage and divorce. However, this may in turn
shed light on the role of law in valuing caregiving on relationship breakdown
and help unpack what it is exactly that is being "rewarded" or compensated
for on civil partnership dissolution and thus divorce. For if, as research
seems to indicate, same-sex couples tend to adopt a more egalitarian
approach to the division of breadwinning and caregiving even where there
are children, the gendered power imbalance in heterosexual relationships
may be easier to identify, expose and, in the longer term, address both from a
family law and welfare law perspective so as to more consistently recognise
the high value of caregiving to society as a whole, detaching it from the
stigma of economic dependency on a husband or on the State.
84 M. Fineman, The Neutered Mother, the Sexual Family and Other Twentieth
Century Tragedies, (Routledge, London, 1995) pp.231-235.
85 An interesting analogy is the recent litigation surrounding the disputed terms of a
"shared parenting" order following the breakdown of a lesbian relationship in
which two children had been born to one partner. This prompted a clearer
examination in the Court of Appeal and then House of Lords of the respective
importance of biological and social or psychological parents to a child. See Re G
(children) (FC) [20061 UKHL 43.
86 See Auchmuty, "When equality is not equity: homosexual inclusion in undue
influence law" (2003) II Feminist Legal Studies 163-190.
87 See Dunne. "Opting into motherhood: lesbians blurring the boundaries and
transforming the meaning of parenthood and kinship" (2000) 14(I) Journal of
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